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Private function evaluation (PFE) is a special case of secure multi-party
computation (MPC), where the function to be computed is known by only one
party. PFE is useful in several real-life applications where an algorithm or a
function itself needs to remain secret for reasons such as protecting intellectual
property or security classification level. In this paper, we focus on improving
2-party PFE based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. In this respect, we
look back at the seminal PFE framework presented by Mohassel and Sadeghian
at Eurocrypt’13. We show how to adapt and utilize the well-known half gates
garbling technique (Zahur et al., Eurocrypt’15) to their constant round 2-party
PFE scheme. Compared to their scheme, our resulting optimization significantly
improves the efficiency of both the underlying Oblivious Evaluation of Extended
Permutation (OEP) and secure 2-party computation (2PC) protocols, and yields
a more than 40% reduction in overall communication cost (the computation time
is also slightly decreased, and the number of rounds remains unchanged).
Keywords: Private function evaluation, Cryptographic protocol, Secure computation,
Communication and computation complexity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that one invents a novel and practical
algorithm capable of being directly used to detect and
identify criminals in crowds with a high degree of
precision based on information about their behaviors
obtained from street video recordings. It is obvious
that this algorithm would be commercially valuable and
that many governmental organizations would like to use
it. The inventor has the right to keep the algorithm
confidential, and to offer only its use for a certain fee
since it is his/her own intellectual property. On the
other hand, governmental organizations will generally
be unwilling to reveal their records and databases to
the parties to whom they do not sufficiently trust. This
is an example of the problem that two parties would
like to execute a common function with their private
inputs and the function is also a private input of one of
the parties. Solution for this and such real-life problems
are addressed by Private Function Evaluation (PFE).
PFE is a special case of secure multi-party
computation (MPC) in which n participants jointly
compute a function f on their private inputs x1, . . . , xn,
and one (or some) of the parties obtain the result
f(x1, . . . , xn) while revealing nothing more to the
parties. The difference of PFE from the standard
MPC setting is that here the function f is also a
private input of one of the participants5. A PFE
solution would be more useful than conventional MPC
in various real-life applications, e.g., the ones where
the function itself contains private information, or
reveals security weaknesses; or the ones where service
providers prefer hiding their function, or its specific
implementation as their intellectual property. Efficient
and practical PFE schemes are becoming increasingly
important as many applications require protection
of their valuable assets such as private database
management systems [1], privacy-preserving intrusion
detection system [2], privacy-preserving checking for
credit worthiness [3] and privacy preserving medical
applications [4]. Therefore, the task of designing
efficient custom PFE protocols for special or generic
5Note that PFE also covers the case where the party who owns
the function does not have any other private input.
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purposes is addressed in several papers in literature [4–
9].
Generic PFE solutions are mainly classified into two
categories. The first one is the universal circuit [10]
based approach that works with any MPC protocol.
The ideal functionality of MPC FUg for a universal
circuit Ug takes as input a certain sized (g) boolean
circuit representation Cf of the private function f , and
inputs of parties x1, . . . , xn (i.e., FUg (Cf , x1, . . . , xn)),
and outputs f(x1, . . . , xn). The works based on this
approach mainly aim to reduce the size of universal
circuits, and to optimize their implementations using
some MPC techniques [5,6,11–13]. The early universal
circuit based schemes result in massive circuit sizes [5,
6,10,14], which was the root cause of their inefficiency.
By the recent works [11] and [13] the universal circuits
becomes more practical but the computation cost is still
worse then the custom PFE protocols of [9, 15].
The second approach is falls into designing custom
PFE protocols which avoids the use of universal
circuits. Following this line of work, several PFE
schemes have been proposed [7–9, 15–17]. An early
attempt on this category is Paus, Sadeghi, and
Schneider’s work [7]. They introduce -what they
called- a semi-private function evaluation in which the
type of the gates is a secret of one party, but the
circuit topology (i.e., the set of all connections of
predecessors and successors of each gate) is public to
both parties. Due to the weaker assumption of semi-
privacy, their approach does not provide a complete
PFE solution. Another significant improvement in this
category comes from Katz and Malka’s 2-party PFE (2-
PFE) scheme [8] with a mechanism for hiding the circuit
topology based on asymmetric cryptography primitives
(i.e., partially (singly) homomorphic encryption (HE)
e.g., ElGamal [18] or Paillier [19]). Following the
line of [8], recently [17] proposed 2-PFE protocols
based on asymmetric cryptography primitives. In
this work, they propose a secure 2-PFE scheme
based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
Their approach introduces a reusability feature that
significantly improves the state-of-the-art.
In [9], Mohassel and Sadeghian come up with a
framework for PFE that includes several schemes for
different settings. They proposed protocols for both
arithmetic and boolean circuits. Their protocol for
arithmetic circuits (based on partially HE) has a
number of rounds equal to the number of gates (see [9,
p. 570]), whereas the other PFE protocols for boolean
circuits have constant number of rounds. Regarding
their arithmetic based protocol, for large circuits, the
number of rounds is a bottleneck. For boolean circuits,
they propose two types of protocols: one is based on
partially HE and the other one is based on oblivious
evaluation of switching networks (OSN). The OSN
based protocol of [9] is (mostly)6 based on symmetric
6The only asymmetric cryptographic structure is due to the
cryptographic primitives.
The existing schemes based on asymmetric crypto-
graphic primitives such as [8,17] and partially HE based
protocol of [9] are promising in terms of linear commu-
nication complexity. However, for some applications,
protocols primarily based on symmetric cryptography
could be favorable.
Considering OSN based 2-PFE scheme of [9], they
split the PFE task into two sub-functionalities: (1)
Circuit topology hiding (CTH), (2) Private gate
evaluation (PGE). Briefly speaking, in CTH, a series of
procedures is performed: First, the function owner (say
P1) detaches the interconnections of the gates to obtain
single gates, and keeps the topological mapping of the
circuit private. Second, P1 and the other party (say P2)
engage in an oblivious evaluation of switching network
(OSN)7 protocol which consists of O(g log(g)) oblivious
transfer (OT) operations (throughout this paper, g
denotes the number of gates, and log() denotes the
logarithm base 2). Next, in PGE, both parties engage
in a Yao’s 2-party computation (2PC) protocol [20, 21]
where P1 and P2 play the evaluator and the garbler
roles, respectively. Each single gate is garbled into
four ciphertexts. By setting all gates as a single gate
type (e.g., NAND or NOR), it is possible to avoid the
necessity of hiding the gate functionality [9].
Recently, in [22], Wang and Malluhi attempt to
improve the 2-PFE scheme of Mohassel and Sadeghian
by removing only one ciphertext from each garbled
gate in the 2PC phase. However, the communication
cost of the 2PC phase is quite lower than that of the
OSN phase, which means that their scheme reduces the
overall cost by less than 1%.
In [15, p. 98] and [12, p. 2] the authors mention that
“the various optimizations that are recently proposed for
MPC [23–25] are making general 2PC more practical
and it is not obvious if their techniques can also be
combined with custom PFE solutions (which remains
as an interesting open question)”. One of the aims of
this work is providing an answer to this open question
and come-up with an efficient 2-PFE protocol.
Our contributions. In this paper, we mainly focus on
improving 2-party private function evaluation (2-PFE)
based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. In this
respect, we first revisit the state-of-the-art Mohassel
and Sadeghian’s PFE framework [9], then propose a
more efficient protocol (secure in the presence of semi-
honest adversaries) by adapting8 the half gates garbling
OT operations of underlying 2PC, therefore can be considered as
symmetric based [13,15].
7The OSN mechanism is introduced in [9] to achieve a solution
for the oblivious evaluation of extended permutation (OEP)
problem. OEP allows the oblivious transition of each masked
gate output to the input(s) of the next connected gate(s).
8Note that in [22], Wang and Malluhi mention that free-
XOR [23] and half gates [25] techniques cannot be used to improve
the efficiency of non-universal circuit based custom PFE protocols
such as Katz and Malka’s [8] and Mohassel and Sadeghian’s [9]
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optimization [25] to their 2-PFE scheme. Our protocol
achieves the following significant improvements in both
OSN and 2PC phases:
1. Regarding the OSN phase: (1) We reduce the
number of required OTs by N = 2g. Concretely,
the technique in [9] requires 2N log(N) + 1 OTs,
while our protocol requires 2N log(N)−N+1 OTs.
(2) Our protocol reduces the data sizes entering
to the OSN protocol by a factor of two. This
improvement results in about 40% saving.
2. Regarding the 2PC phase, our scheme garbles each
non-output gate (that does not have any direct
connection with output wires of the circuit) with
only three ciphertexts, and each output gate with
only two ciphertexts.
Among the above improvements, the foremost gain
comes from the reduction in the input sizes of the OSN
protocol. The overall communication cost of our scheme
is (6N log(N) + 0.5N + 3)λ bits9, which is a significant
improvement compared to [9], whose communication
cost is (10N log(N) + 4N + 5)λ bits. This means more
than 40% saving in bandwidth size (see Table 5 and
Table 6). Also the overall computation cost is also
slightly decreased while the number of rounds remains
unchanged.
Organization In Section 2, we give preliminary
information about oblivious transfer, Yao’s garbled
circuits, and half gates optimization. In Section
3, we present the 2-PFE framework and scheme
of [9] in detail. In Section 4, we introduce our 2-
PFE scheme. Section 5 provides a simulation based
security proof of our 2-PFE scheme in the semi-honest
model. In Section 6, we analyze our protocol in terms
of communication and computation complexities and
compare it with 2-PFE scheme in [9]. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper and point out some future works.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides some background information on
oblivious transfer, Yao’s garbled circuits, and the state-
of-the-art half gates optimization.
2.1. Oblivious transfer (OT)
A k-out-of-m oblivious transfer protocol is a two-party
protocol where one of the parties is the sender (S) who
has set of values {x1, . . . , xm}, and the other one is the
receiver (R) who has k selection indices. At the end of
the protocol, R only learns k of the S’s inputs according
to his selection indices; whereas S learns nothing. In
the OT-hybrid model, the two parties are given access
works. In contrast to their claim, we adapt and utilize half
gates approach to Mohassel and Sadeghian’s and reduce the
communication cost in a secure way.
9λ is the security parameter throughout this paper.
to the ideal OT functionality (FOT ) which implies a
universally composable OT protocol. Oblivious transfer
is a critical underlying protocol used in many MPC
constructions [26,27].
OT extension is a way of obtaining many OTs
from a few number of OT runs and cheap symmetric
cryptographic operations. Ishai et al. constructed the
first OT extension method [28], which reduces a given
large number of required OTs to a fixed size security
parameter. Later, several OT extension schemes based
on [28] are proposed for improving the efficiency [29,30].
2.2. Yao’s protocol
Yao’s protocol is essentially a 2PC protocol secure in
the semi-honest adversary model. It allows two parties,
the garbler and the evaluator, to evaluate an arbitrary
polynomial-sized function f(x) = f(x1, x2), where x1
is the garbler’s private input and x2 is the evaluator’s
private input, without leaking any information about
their private inputs to each other beyond what is
implied by the pure knowledge of the function output.
The main idea is that the garbler prepares an encrypted
version of Cf (a boolean circuit representation of f).
This encrypted version is called the garbled circuit
Fˆ and sent to the evaluator. The evaluator then
computes the output from the garbled version of the
circuit without obtaining the garbler’s input bits or
intermediate values.
Recently, several major optimizations proposed for
Yao’s protocol, mainly aiming at bandwidth efficiency
and or reduction of the garbling and evaluating costs
(e.g., point and permute [31], garbled row reduction 3
ciphertexts (GRR3) [32], free-XOR [23], garbled row
reduction 2 ciphertexts (GRR2) [33], pipelining [34],
fleXOR [24], half gates [25], and garbling gadgets [35]).
With the recent optimizations, Yao’s protocol has now
impressive results from the complexity point of view.
2.3. Half gates technique
In [25], Zahur, Rosulek, and Evans propose an elegant
and efficient garbling scheme called half gates technique.
Their garbling technique is currently known the
most efficient optimization in terms of communication
complexity compared to any prior scheme. This
technique remains compatible with free-XOR [23] while
also reducing the ciphertext requirement for each odd
gate10 to two. Here, we briefly describe the garbling
procedure of odd gates using the half gates technique,
and refer the reader to [25] for further details and its
security proof.
Any odd gate type can be written in the form of
Equation (2.1) where α1, α2 and α3 define the gate
type, e.g., setting α1 = 0, α2 = 0, α3 = 1 results in a
10Odd and Even gates are fan-in-two logic gates. The former
has an odd number of TRUE outputs in its truth table; while the
latter has an even number of those.
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TABLE 1. Garbling an odd gate using half gates technique [25].
Garbler half gate (pb known to the
garbler)
Evaluator half gate (pb ⊕ vb known to the
evaluator)
Defines the half gate:
fG(va, pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(α2 ⊕ pb)⊕ α3
Defines the half gate:
fE(va, vb ⊕ pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(pb ⊕ vb)
Computes:
TGc ← H(w0a)⊕H(w1a)⊕ (pb ⊕ α2)R
w0Gc ← H(wpaa )⊕ fG(pa, pb)R
Computes:
TEc ← H(w0b )⊕H(w1b )⊕ wα1a
w0Ec ← H(wpbb )
The garbler sends TGc. The garbler sends TEc.
NAND gate [25]. Let vi denote the one bit truth value
on the ith wire in a circuit.
fGodd(va, vb)→ (α1 ⊕ va) ∧ (α2 ⊕ vb)⊕ α3 (2.1)
The garbler garbles an odd gate by following the steps
for both half gates in Table 1. The tokens for FALSE
and TRUE on the ith wire are denoted as w0i and wi,
respectively. The global free-XOR offset is denoted as
R.
The garbler sets R {0, 1}λ−11 globally, and w0i 
{0, 1}λ and w1i ← w0i ⊕ R for each wire. We have
lsb(R) = 1 so that lsb(w0i ) 6= lsb(w1i ). wbGc and wbEc
denote the tokens for the garbler and the evaluator half
gate outputs for truth value b, respectively. TGc and
TEc denote the λ-bit strings needing to be sent for the
garbler and evaluator half gates, respectively. Let wi
be a token on ith wire obtained by the evaluator who
does not know its corresponding truth value vi. For
the ith wire, let pi := lsb(w
0
i ), a value only known
to the garbler. If two symbols are appended, an AND
operation is implied, i.e., ab = a∧ b. H : {0, 1}λ×Z→
{0, 1}λ denotes a hash function with circular correlation
robustness for naturally derived keys11, having the
security parameter λ.
The token on the output wire of the odd gate for
FALSE is w0Gc ⊕ w0Ec since the output of the odd gate
is an XOR of half gate outputs. The two ciphertexts
computed TGc and TEc are needed to be sent to the
evaluator for each gate.
3. 2-PARTY PFE FRAMEWORK
In [9], Mohassel and Sadeghian introduce a generic PFE
framework for boolean and arithmetic circuits. In this
work, our focus is mainly on private function evaluation
based on boolean circuits in 2-party setting i.e., 2-PFE.
In order to achieve 2-PFE, Mohassel and Sadeghian
show that hiding (i) the parties’ private inputs, (ii) the
topology of the circuit representation Cf , and (iii) the
functionality of its gates is required. The framework
is not concerned with hiding the numbers of gates,
11Circular correlation robustness for naturally derived keys is
the security requirement for a suitable hash function used in half
gates garbling. We refer the reader to [25] for its details.
input/output wires and the type of the gates of the
circuit. The complete task of PFE is classified into two
functionalities: (1) Circuit Topology Hiding (CTH), (2)
Private Gate Evaluation (PGE).
Throughout this paper the party who knows the
private function is denoted by P1, plays the evaluator
role in 2PC; whereas the other party is denoted by P2
plays the garbler role in 2PC. In a nutshell, in CTH, P1
extracts the topological mapping pif (kept private) from
the circuit representation Cf , and converts the whole
circuit into a collection of single gates. Then P1 and P2
engage in an oblivious evaluation of switching network
(OSN) protocol where P2 obliviously obtains tokens on
gate inputs. In PGE, a 2PC protocol is performed to
obtain the final output. In the rest of this section, we
describe the notions related to CTH, and the 2-PFE
scheme proposed in [9].
3.1. Context of CTH
Let n and m denote the number of inputs and outputs
of Cf , respectively. Let g be the number of gates (size of
circuit). OW : {ow1, . . . , own+g−m} denotes the set of
outgoing wires which is the union of the input wires of
the circuit and the output wires of its non-output gates
(having M = n+ g−m elements in total whose indices
are chosen randomly). Similarly, IW : {iw1, . . . , iw2g}
denotes the set of incoming wires which is the input
wires of each gate in the circuit (having N = 2g
elements in total whose indices are chosen randomly).
The full description of the topology of a boolean
circuit Cf can be accomplished by a mapping pif :
OW→ IW. The mapping pif maps i to j (i.e., pif (i)→
j), if and only if owi ∈ OW and iwj ∈ IW correspond to
the same wire in the circuit Cf . Note that the mapping
pif is not a function if an outgoing wire corresponds to
more than one incoming wire, while its inverse pi−1f is
always a function. Figure 1 shows an example circuit
Cf and its mapping pif .
From the inclusion-exclusion principle, we obtain
Equation (3.2) that gives the number of possible
mappings for the given M and N values.
ρ =
M∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
M
i
)
(M − i)N (3.2)
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FIGURE 1. (a) A circuit representation Cf of a function f . (b) The mapping pif of f .
In the context of CTH, ρ indicates the number of
possible circuit topologies. Thus, the security of CTH is
proportional to ρ. In what follows, we describe the main
elements of CTH functionality whose essential target is
the oblivious application of the mapping pif .
Oblivious evaluation of mapping A mapping of the
form pi : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N} is a permutation if it
is a bijection. We next define the extended permutation
(EP) as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Extended permutation (EP)).
Given the positive integers M and N , a mapping pi :
{1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , N} is called an EP if for all
y ∈ {1, . . . , N}, there exists a unique x ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
such that pi(x) = y, and its inverse pi−1 : {1, . . . , N} →
{1, . . . ,M} is an onto function.
The ideal 2-party oblivious evaluation of extended
permutation (2-OEP) functionality is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2 (2-OEP functionality). The first
party P1’s inputs are an EP pi : {1, . . . ,M} →
{1, . . . , N}, and a blinding vector for incoming wires
T := [tj  {0, 1}λ] for j = 1, . . . , N . The other
party P2’s inputs are a vector for outgoing wires W :=
[wi  {0, 1}λ] for i = 1, . . . ,M . At the end, P2 learns
S := [σj = wpi−1f (j)
⊕tj ] for j = 1, . . . , N while P1 learns
nothing.
We call any 2-party protocol construction realizing
the 2-OEP functionality as a 2-OEP protocol. Mohassel
and Sadeghian have constructed a constant round
2-OEP protocol by introducing the OSN structure.
Since we also utilize their 2-OEP protocol in our
scheme, here we give some of its details. Mainly,
they first construct an extended permutation using
switching networks, then provide a method using OTs
for oblivious evaluation of the resulting switching
network. We refer our reader to [9] for the security
proof and application of this construction on various
MPC protocols.
EP construction from switching networks. Each 2-
switch takes two λ-bit strings and two selection bits
as input, outputting two λ-bit strings [9]. Each of
the outputs may get the value of any of the input
strings depending on the selection bits. This means
for input values (x0, x1), there are four different switch
output possibilities. The two selection bits s0 and s1
are used for determining the switch output (y0, y1). In
particular, the switch outputs y0 = xs0 , and y1 = xs1 .
Unlike 2-switches, 1-switches have only one selection
bit s. For an input (x0, x1), a 1-switch outputs one of
the two possible outputs: (x0, x1) if s = 0, and (x1, x0)
otherwise.
Definition 3.3 (Switching Network (SN)). A
switching network SN is a collection of interconnected
switches whose inputs are N λ-bit strings and a set of
selection bits of all switches, and whose outputs are N
λ-bit strings.
The mapping pi : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N} related to
an SN (pi(i) = j) implies that when the SN is executed,
the string on the output wire j gets the value of that on
the input wire i.
A permutation network PN is a special type of
SN whose mapping is a permutation of its inputs.
In contrast to SNs, PNs composed of 1-switches.
Waksman proposes an efficient PN construction in [36].
Mainly, this work suggests that a PN with N = 2κ
inputs can be constructed with N log(N) − N + 1
switches. In [9], the authors propose the construction of
an extended permutation by combining SNs and PNs.
However, extended permutations differ from SNs in that
the number of their inputs M and that of their outputs
N need not be equal (M ≤ N). N − M additional
dummy inputs are added to the real inputs of an EP
pi : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , N} in order to simulate it
as an SN. The SN design for extended permutation is
divided into the following three components (see also
Figure 2).
1. Dummy placement component. Dummy
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FIGURE 2. The related switching network for the mapping pif in Figure 1.
placement component takes N input strings
composing of real and dummy ones. For each
real input that pi maps to k different outputs, the
dummy-value placement component’s output is the
real string followed by k − 1 dummy strings.
2. Replication component. Replication compo-
nent takes the output of the dummy-value place-
ment component as input. If a value is real, it goes
unchanged. If it is a dummy value, it is replaced
by the real value which precedes it. This can be
computed by a series of N −1 2-switches whose se-
lection bits (s0, s1) are either (0,0) or (0,1). If the
selection bits are (0,0), that means x1 is dummy,
and x0 goes both of the outputs. If they are (0,1),
that means both inputs are real, and both are kept
on the outputs in the same order. At the end of
this step, all the dummy inputs are replaced by the
necessary copies of the real inputs.
3. Permutation component. Permutation compo-
nent takes the output wires of the replication com-
ponent as input. It outputs a permutation of them
so that each string is placed on its final location
according to the prescription of mapping pi.
An efficient implementation of both dummy place-
ment and permutation blocks is via the use of a Waks-
man permutation network. Combining these three com-
ponents, one gets a larger switching network, where the
number of switches needed is 2(N log(N)−N+1)+N−1
= 2N log(N) − N + 1 [9]. The topology of the whole
switching network is the same for all N input EPs, and
the selection bits specify the input values appearing on
the outputs.
Oblivious evaluation of SN construction (OSN) We
continue with describing Mohassel and Sadeghian’s
method for oblivious evaluation of switching networks
using OTs.
Adapting the switching network construction to the
2-OEP functionality, P1 produces the selection bits of
the switching network using pi, and has a blinding vector
T . P2 has an input vector for outgoing wires W . At the
end, P2 learns the switching network’s blinded output
TABLE 2. P1 learns one of these rows according to his
selection bits.
(s0u,s1u) y0 y1
(0,0) w1 ⊕ rc w1 ⊕ rd
(0,1) w1 ⊕ rc w2 ⊕ rd
(1,0) w2 ⊕ rc w1 ⊕ rd
(1,1) w2 ⊕ rc w2 ⊕ rd
vector for incoming wires S, and P1 learns ⊥. We
describe the oblivious evaluation of one of its building
block, i.e., a single 2-switch u.
Let the input wires of the 2-switch be a and b, and its
output wires be c and d. Each of the four wires of the
switch has a uniformly random string assigned by P2 as
her share of that wire in the preparation stage, namely,
ra, rb, rc, rd  {0, 1}λ for a, b, c, d, respectively. P1 has
the strings w1 ⊕ ra and w2 ⊕ rb as his shares for the
two input wires. The purpose is enabling P1 to obtain
his output shares according to his selection bits. There
are four possibilities for P1’s output shares depending
on his selection bits s0u and s1u (see Table 2).
P2 prepares a table with four rows using ra, rb, rc, rd
(see Table 3). P1 and P2 engage in a 1-out-of-4 OT in
which P2 inputs the four rows that she has prepared,
and P1 inputs his selection bits for the switch u. At
the end, P1 learns one of the rows as the output in the
table. Assume that P1’s selection bits are (1,0). This
means P1 retrieves the third row, i.e., (rb⊕ rc, ra⊕ rd).
According to the his selection bits, P1 XORs his input
share w2 ⊕ rb with rb ⊕ rc, as well as his other input
share w1⊕ra with ra⊕rd, and obtains his output shares
w2 ⊕ rc and w1 ⊕ rd.
The oblivious evaluation of the entire SN for EP goes
as follows. In an offline stage, P2 sets a uniformly
random λ-bit string to each wire in the switching
network. P2 blinds each element of her input vector W
and the dummy strings which she assigned for N −M
inputs of the switching network with her corresponding
shares for input wires (an XOR operation is involved in
each blinding). P2 prepares tables for each switch in
the switching network similar to Table 2 and Table 3.
However, both tables for each switch in this scenario
have two rows since each switch, in fact, has two
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TABLE 3. P1 gets one of these rows by engaging in 1-out-
of-4 OT with P2.
(s0u,s1u) Ω0 Ω1
(0,0) ra ⊕ rc ra ⊕ rd
(0,1) ra ⊕ rc rb ⊕ rd
(1,0) rb ⊕ rc ra ⊕ rd
(1,1) rb ⊕ rc rb ⊕ rd
possible outputs12. This means each switch in the entire
switching network can be evaluated running 1-out-of-
2 OT. Moreover, the construction permits parallel OT
runs and or use of OT extension, resulting in a constant
round scheme. P2 needs to send her blinded inputs
to P1, which can be done during her turn in OT
extension in order not to increase the round complexity
unnecessarily. Once P1 gets P2’s blinded inputs which
are also his input shares and the outputs of all OTs,
he evaluates the entire switching network in topological
order, obtaining his output shares. P1 blinds his output
shares with corresponding elements of T (again, an XOR
operation is involved in each blinding), and sends the
resulting vector to P2. P2 unblinds each element using
her shares for output wires, and obtains the OEP output
S. The extended permutation in this construction
includes 2N log(N)−N + 1 switches in total, requiring
2N log(N)−N + 1 OTs for their oblivious evaluation.
3.2. Mohassel and Sadeghian’s 2-PFE scheme
Here we provide an outline of Mohassel and Sadeghian’s
2-PFE construction, and refer the reader to their work
for detailed information and its security proof [9].
Their protocol is as follows. P2 first randomly
generates tokens w0i , w
1
i  {0, 1}λ for each owi ∈ OW
corresponding to FALSE and TRUE, respectively. P1
also generates random blinding strings t0j , t
1
j  {0, 1}λ
for each iwj ∈ IW. And then P1 and P2 engage
in OSN slightly modified from their 2-OEP protocol,
where at the end, P2 learns [σ
0
j = w
0
pi−1f (j)
⊕ tbjj ] and
[σ1j = w
1
pi−1f (j)
⊕ tb¯jj ]. P2 garbles each gate by encrypting
the tokens w0c , w
1
c on its outgoing wire with the blinded
strings σ0a, σ
1
a, σ
0
b , σ
1
b on its incoming wires according
to its truth table. P2 sends the garbled gates and
her garbled input tokens to P1. P1 gets his garbled
input tokens using OT which can be done in an earlier
stage together with other OTs not to increase round
complexity. Using the circuit mapping, his blinding
strings, the garbled gates and the garbled inputs P1
evaluates the whole garbled circuit, and obtains the
tokens of output bits of f(x). In [9], a gate hiding
mechanism is not provided for 2-PFE scheme but
instead all gates in the circuit are let to be only a NAND
12For the 1-switches in dummy placement and permutation
components, the first and second rows of Table 2 and Table 3,
and for 2-switches in replacement components, the second and
third rows of Table 2 and Table 3 are sufficient.
gate.
Mohassel and Sadeghian’s scheme involves oblivious
evaluation of a switching network made of 2N log(N) +
1 switches. This is composed of an additional N
switches to the ones in their EP construction. The
oblivious evaluation of this switching network requires
2N log(N) + 1 OTs [9]. All of the OTs in the
protocol can be combined for just one invocation
of OT extension. The overall computation cost13
of [9] is about 6N log(N) + 2N + 12 symmetric-key
cryptographic operations.
4. OUR EFFICIENT 2-PARTY PFE
SCHEME
In what follows, we describe our scheme in detail (see
also Figure 4). In the preparation stage, P1 compiles
the function into a boolean circuit Cf consisting of only
NAND gates14, and extract the circuit mapping pif by
randomly assigning incoming and outgoing wire indices.
Both parties need to have the pre-knowledge of template
of private circuit C˜f defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Template of Private Circuit (C˜f )).
A template of private circuit C˜f is some information
about a circuit Cf which consists of: (1) the number of
each party’s input bits, (2) the number of output bits,
(3) the total numbers of incoming (N) and outgoing
wires (M), (4) the incoming and outgoing wire indices
which belong to the same gates, (5) the outgoing wire
indices corresponding to each parties inputs, and (6)
the incoming wire indices belonging to output gates.
We continue with describing the main parts of our
scheme, namely 2-OEP and 2PC garbling protocols.
Our complete 2-party PFE protocol is provided in
Figure 3.
4.1. Use of 2-OEP protocol
Let w0i and w
1
i be the tokens for FALSE and TRUE
on the ith outgoing wire owi ∈ OW, respectively, and
R be the global free-XOR offset [23] throughout the
circuit. P2 sets w
0
i  {0, 1}λ for each owi. The blinding
string on the jth incoming wire iwj ∈ IW is denoted
as tj . P1 sets tj  {0, 1}λ for each iwj . P1 and P2
engage in a 2-OEP protocol where P1’s inputs are pif
and a blinding vector for incoming wires T := [tj ] for
j = 1, . . . , N , and P2’s inputs is a token vector for
FALSE on outgoing wires W 0 := [w0i ] for i = 1, . . . ,M .
At the end, P2 learns the vector of blinded strings for
FALSE S0 := [σ0j = wpi−1f (j)
⊕ tj ] for j = 1, . . . , N , while
P1 learns ⊥.
13In [11], the computation cost of [9] is also computed. We note
that there is a minor typo in [11, p. 723] i.e., the computation
complexity of [9] should be 12g log(2g) + 4g + 12 instead of
12 log(2g) + 4g + 12 where N = 2g and g is the number of gates.
14Any functional-complete gate can be used to rule out the need
for a gate hiding mechanism as in [9].
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TABLE 4. Adapting half gates technique to our 2-PFE for garbling an odd gate. Here, α1, α2 and α3 define the gate
type (e.g., α1 = 0, α2 = 0 and α3 = 1 for a NAND gate, see Equation (2.1)). The token w
0
c on the output wire equals
w0Gc ⊕ w0Ec ⊕ ψc. The three ciphertexts TGc, TEc, and ψc are sent to P1 for each gate.
Garbler half gate (pb known to the
garbler)
Evaluator half gate (pb ⊕ vb known to the
evaluator)
Defines the half gate:
fG(va, pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(α2 ⊕ pb)⊕ α3
Defines the half gate:
fE(va, vb ⊕ pb) := (α1 ⊕ va)(pb ⊕ vb)
Computes:
TGc ← H(σ0a)⊕H(σ1a)⊕ (pb ⊕ α2)R
w0Gc ← H(σpaa )⊕ fG(pa, pb)R
Computes:
TEc ← H(σ0b )⊕H(σ1b )⊕ σα1a
w0Ec ← H(σpbb )
Defines the third ciphertext:
ψc := w
0
Gc ⊕ w0Ec ⊕ w0c
P2 sends TGc, TEc, and ψc.
Since our protocol allows all wires in the circuit to
have the same offset R, unlike [9], P1 needs only a single
blinding string tj for each wire, and P2 does not need
to input both tokens w0i and w
1
i to the 2-OEP protocol.
This leads to a considerable decrease in communication
cost compared to [9], in which two blinding strings t0j
and t1j for each wire are used, and both w
0
i and w
1
i are
inputs to the OSN protocol (slightly modified 2-OEP
protocol).
Our 2-PFE Scheme
P1’s Input: A bit string x1 and a function f .
P2’s Input: A bit string x2.
Output: f(x1, x2).
Preparation:
1. P1 compiles the private function f into a boolean circuit Cf whose the number of input bits, output bits, and gates
are n, o, and g, respectively, extracts the mapping pif by randomly assigning incoming and outgoing wire indices,
and prepare the template of private circuit C˜f .
2. P1 sends C˜f to P2.
3. P2 randomly generates an λ-bit token w
0
i  {0, 1}λ for FALSE on each owi ∈ OW. This yields a total of M = n+g−o
pairs. Moreover, P2 sets a vector W
0 := [w0i ] for i = 1, . . . ,M .
4. P1 generates an λ-bit blinding string tj  {0, 1}λ for each iwj ∈ IW. He sets those values to a blinding vector
T := [tj ] for j = 1, . . . , 2g.
2-OEP Protocol:
5. P2 and P1 engage in a 2-OEP protocol where P1’s inputs are the mapping pif and T , while P2’s input is the vector
W 0. At the end, P2 learns the blinded string vector S
0 := [σ0j = wpi−1
f
(j)
⊕ tj ] for j = 1, . . . , N , while P1 learns ⊥.
2PC Protocol (P2 plays the garbler, and P1 plays the evaluator):
6. Garbling: P2 generates a secret λ-bit offset R  {0, 1}λ−11. P2 sets the token for TRUE on each owi as
w1i ← w0i ⊕ R, and the blinded for TRUE on each iwj as σ1j ← σ0j ⊕ R. Moreover, P2 sets the sets W 1 := [w1i ] for
i = 1, . . . ,M and S1 := [σ1j ] for j = 1, . . . , N . With the knowledge of W
0, S0, S1 and C˜f , P2 garbles each odd
gate using the Gb procedure in Figure 5, resulting in three ciphertexts per non-output gate and two ciphertexts
per output gate. P2 sends the garbled circuit Fˆ and the tokens Xˆ2 for her own inputs x2 to P1. P1 gets tokens
Xˆ1 for his own input bits x1 from P2 using 1-out-of-2 OTs. (If OSN construction is used, these OTs can be jointly
executed with the ones for 2-OEP protocol in parallel and with just one invocation of extended OT. For this setting,
P2 needs to pick R and compute the tokens for TRUE on P1’s input wires before 2-OEP protocol.)
7. Evaluating: With the knowledge of pif , T , Fˆ and the garbled input Xˆ = (Xˆ1, Xˆ2), P1 evaluates the whole garbled
circuit in topological order. When an outgoing wire i is mapped to an incoming wire j, the token wi is XORed with
tj to reach the blinded string σj . P1 evaluates each garbled gate using the Ev procedure in Figure 5. At the end,
P1 obtains the tokens for f(x1, x2).
FIGURE 3. Our 2-Party Private Function Evaluation Protocol
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generate the set:generate the set:
2-OEP Protocol
join 2-OEP protocol as 
Sender
join 2-OEP protocol as 
Receiver
receive:receive:
2PC Protocol
join 2PC protocol as 
Garbler
join 2PC protocol as 
Evaluator
f synt Cf CTH (πf
~Cf
~Cf, )
keep π  privatef
T :=[t       {0,1}  ]j λ 
where  j = 1,…, N where  i = 1,…, M
W :=[w      {0,1}  ]i λ 0 0 
P P1 2
S  := [σ        w      t ]jj0 0 0 π ( j)f-1
FIGURE 4. Components and high level procedures of our PFE protocol. The private function f is only known to P1. P1
compiles f into a boolean circuit Cf , and extracts the mapping pif and the template of private circuit C˜f . P1 sends C˜f to
P2. P1 randomly generates the vector T . P2 randomly generates the vector W 0. They engage in a 2-OEP protocol where P2
learns S0 as the output. With the knowledge of W 0, S0 and C˜f , P2 garbles each gate and sends the garbled circuit to P1.
With the knowledge of pif , C˜f , T , the garbled circuit and the garbled inputs, P1 evaluates the whole garbled circuit.
4.2. Our 2PC garbling scheme for 2-PFE
This section presents our garbling scheme based on half
gates technique [25]. Similar to half gates technique,
P2 sets R  {0, 1}λ−11, w1i ← w0i ⊕ R for TRUE on
each owi, and σ
1
j ← σ0j ⊕ R for TRUE on each iwj .
We have lsb(R) = 1 so that lsb(w0i ) 6= lsb(w1i ), and
lsb(σ0j ) 6= lsb(σ1j ). P2 follows the steps in Table 4 in
order to garble each odd gate.
We now give some necessary notation as follows.
Let w0c and w
1
c denote both tokens on an outgoing
wire, while σ0a, σ
1
a, σ
0
b , σ
1
b denote the blinded strings
on incoming wires. Let also vj denote the one bit
truth value on the jth incoming wire in a circuit.
Further, wbGc and w
b
Ec denote the tokens for the garbler
and the evaluator half gate outputs for truth value
b, respectively. TGc and TEc denote the λ-bit strings
needed to be sent for the garbler and evaluator half
gates, respectively. ψc denotes the additional λ-bit
string needed to be sent for carrying to the specific
output token. wi and σj are the token on ith outgoing
wire and the blinded string on jth incoming wire
obtained by P1 while evaluating the garbled circuit,
respectively. For the jth incoming wire, let pj :=
lsb(σ0j ) be a value only known to P2. If two symbols are
appended, we imply an AND operation, i.e., ab = a∧ b.
H : {0, 1}λ ×Z→ {0, 1}λ denotes a hash function with
circular correlation robustness for naturally derived
keys, having the security parameter λ. We use a
‘hat ’ to represent a sequence or a tuple, for instance,
Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .) or eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
In accordance with the framework15 of [37], Figure
5 depicts our complete garbling scheme, composed
of the following procedures. The garble procedure
Gb takes 1λ, C˜f , S0 and W 0 as input, and outputs
(Fˆ , eˆ, dˆ) where Fˆ is the garbled version of C˜f , eˆ is the
encoding information, and dˆ is decoding information.
Gb calls two private gate garbling procedures: (1)
Gb∗NAND garbles non-output NAND gates, and returns
(TG, TE , ψ), (2) GbNAND garbles output NAND gates,
and returns (TG, TE , Y
0). En is the encode algorithm
that takes the plaintext input xˆ of the circuit and e as
input, and outputs a garbled input Xˆ. Ev is the evaluate
procedure that takes the inputs Fˆ , Xˆ, pif and T , and
outputs garbled output Yˆ . De is the decode algorithm
that takes Yˆ and d as input, and outputs the plaintext
output yˆ of the circuit.
We highlight that an essential difference of our
garbling scheme from the half gates technique is that
the former requires an additional ciphertext ψc per gate.
15Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway introduce the notion of a
garbling scheme as a cryptographic primitive. They also describe
procedures and security requirements of garbling schemes. We
refer the reader to [37, 38] for details concerning definitions and
introduction to the formal concepts of garbling schemes.
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proc Gb(1λ, C˜f , S0,W 0) : proc En(eˆ, xˆ):
R {0, 1}λ−1 1 for ei ∈ eˆ do
for iwj ∈ C˜f do Xi ← ei ⊕ xiR
σ1j ← σ0j ⊕R return Xˆ
for owi ∈ Inputs(C˜f ) do
ei ← w0i
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do proc Ev(Fˆ , Xˆ, pif ,T ):
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) put Fˆ in topological order using pif
if G˜i is a non-output gate then for owi ∈ Inputs(Fˆ ) and j = pif (i) do
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Gb∗NAND(σ0a, σ0b , w0i ) σj ← Xi ⊕ tj
Fnon−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi) for each gate G˜i {in topo. order} do
else {a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i)
(TGi , TEi , Y
0
i )← GbNAND(σ0a, σ0b ) sa ← lsb(σa); sb ← lsb(σb)
F outi ← (TGi , TEi) k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
Y 1i ← Y 0i ⊕R (TGi , TEi , ψi)← Fnon−outi
di ← lsb(Y 0i ) wGi ← H(σa, k)⊕ saTGi
end if if G˜i is a non-output gate then
return (Fˆ , eˆ, dˆ) wEi ← H(σb, k′)⊕ sb(TEi ⊕ σa)
wi ← wGi ⊕ wEi ⊕ ψi
private proc Gb∗NAND(σ
0
a, σ
0
b , w
0): for j = pif (i) do
pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b ) σj ← wi ⊕ tj
k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex() else
TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕H(σ1a, k)⊕ pbR (TGi , TEi)← F outi
w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG ⊕R wGi ← H(σa, k)⊕ saTGi
TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕H(σ1b , k′)⊕ σ0a wEi ← H(σb, k′)⊕ sb(TEi ⊕ σa)
w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pb(TE ⊕ σ0a) wi ← wGi ⊕ wEi
ψ ← w0G ⊕ w0E ⊕ w0 Yi ← wi
return (TG, TE , ψ) end if
return Yˆ
private proc GbNAND(σ
0
a, σ
0
b ):
pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b )
k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex() proc De(dˆ, Yˆ ):
TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕H(σ1a, k)⊕ pbR for di ∈ dˆ do
w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG ⊕R yi ← di ⊕ lsb(Yi)
TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕H(σ1b , k′)⊕ σ0a return yˆ
w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pb(TE ⊕ σ0a)
Y 0 ← w0G ⊕ w0E
return (TG, TE , Y
0)
FIGURE 5. Our complete half gate based garbling scheme for 2-PFE. GbNAND and Gb
∗
NAND are the original half gate and
our modified NAND garbling procedures, respectively. A ‘hat ’ represents a sequence or a tuple, for instance, Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .)
or eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
proc De(dˆ, Yˆ ):
for di ∈ dˆ do
{modify the antepenultimate line of Gb} k ← NextIndex(); parse (h0, h1)← di
k ← NextIndex(); di ← (H(Y 0i , k), H(Y 1i , k)) if H(Yi, k) = h0 then yi ← 0
else if H(Yi, k) = h1 then yi ← 1
else return ⊥
return yˆ
FIGURE 6. Modification of our garbling scheme in Figure 5 for achieving authenticity (auth) property.
This is required because of the nature of 2-PFE, in
which the tokens on an outgoing wire are predetermined
and specified values, while in the in half gates they
are indeed a function of the input strings. Since in
our scheme the output tokens of output gates are not
predetermined, these gates can be garbled with half
gates technique. Each output gate is then garbled with
two ciphertexts. Note also that P1 gets his own garbled
inputs by means of OT. This can also be done in an
earlier stage together with other OTs in 2-OEP protocol
(if OSN construction is used) in order not to increase
round complexity. For this setting, P2 needs to pick R
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prv.simG,Φ,S : obv.simG,Φ,S : authG:
Garble(f, x): Garble(f, x): Garble(f, x):
if β = 0 if β = 0 (F, e, d)←Gb(1λ, f)
(F, e, d)←Gb(1λ, f) (F, e, d)←Gb(1λ, f) X ←En(e, x)
X ←En(e, x) X ←En(e, x) return (F,X)
else (F,X, d)← S (1λ, f(x),Φ(f)) else (F,X)← S (1λ,Φ(f)) Finalize(Y ):
return (F,X, d) return (F,X) return De(d, Y ) 6∈ {⊥, f(x)}
FIGURE 7. Simulation based games for privacy, obliviousness and authenticity [37]. The function S is a simulator, and G
denotes a garbling scheme.
and compute the tokens for TRUE on P1’s input wires
before 2-OEP protocol. This setting is compatible with
our protocol as well.
5. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED PRO-
TOCOL
In this section, we start by revisiting the code based
games of Bellare, Hoang and Rogaway [37] and security
notions of Choi et al. [39] and Zahur et al. [25]
as preliminaries. We then provide simulation based
security proof of our proposed protocol.
5.1. Code based games and security notions
Our work uses the prv.simS (privacy), obv.simS (obliv-
iousness) and authS (authenticity) security definitions
of [37] depicted in Figure 7. Considering the prv.sim
and obv.sim games, the Initialize procedure randomly
chooses β ← {0, 1}, then the adversary makes a sin-
gle call to the Garble procedure, and then the Finalize
procedure returns β
?
= β′, where β′ denotes the guess
of the adversary. Regarding all three games, the ad-
versary is allowed to make a single call to the Garble
procedure. For further information about the simula-
tion based games and related security properties, we
refer reader to [37]. The advantages of the correspond-
ing adversary classes are as follows:
Adv
prv.sim
G,Φ,S (A , λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[prv.simAG,Φ,S (1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Advobv.simG,Φ,S (A , λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[obv.simAG,Φ,S (1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
AdvauthG (A , λ) := Pr[auth
A
G(1
λ) = 1]
In order to provide the security of a scheme, in each
game, the adversary must have a negligible advantage.
We also utilize the following two oracle definitions
of [25].
• CircR(x, j, b) = H(x ⊕ R, j) ⊕ bR where R ∈
{0, 1}λ−11
• Rand(x, j, b): A random function that gives λ-bit
output.
Note that the adversary is only allowed to access the
oracle CircR with legal queries
16 in order to prevent the
adversary from trivially obtaining R [39]. Furthermore,
we give the following definition for natural queries.
Definition 5.1. [25] If a series of queries of the
form (x, j, b) to an oracle O satisfies the following
conditions
• we have i = q for the qth query,
• b ∈ {0, 1},
• x is naturally derived, i.e., it is obtained by one
of these operations:
(a) x {0, 1}k,
(b) x ← x1 ⊕ x2, where x1 and x2 are naturally
derived,
(c) x ← H(x1, i) where x1 is naturally derived
and i ∈ Z,
(d) x← O(x1, i, b) where x1 is naturally derived,
then these queries are natural.
If for all PPT adversaries A making legal and natural
queries∣∣∣∣ PrRand[ARand(1λ) = 1]− PrR [ACircR(1λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < 
then H satisfies circular correlation robustness property
for naturally derived keys, where  is negligible.
5.2. Security Proof
Our security proof is based on the security proofs
provided in [8] and [25].
Theorem 5.1. If the following three conditions hold
– the 2-OEP protocol securely realizes ideal 2-
OEP functionality in presence of semi-honest
adversaries,
– the hash function H has circular correlation
robustness for naturally derived keys,
– the OT scheme for acquisition of P1’s garbled
input by P2 securely realizes FOT functionality
in the OT-hybrid model against semi-honest
adversaries,
16A series of queries of the form (x, j, b) is legal if the verbatim
value of (x, j) is never queried with alternating values of b [39].
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proc S(1λ, C˜f , pif , T , yˆ) : private proc Sim∗NAND(σ
0
a, σ
0
b , w
0): //
 SimNAND(σ0a, σ0b ):
for owi ∈ OW ˜(Cf ) do pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b )
w0i  {0, 1}λ k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
for iwj ∈ IW ˜(Cf ) do TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ Rand(σ0a, k, pb)
σ0j ← wpi−1
f
(j)
⊕ tj w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG
for owi ∈ Inputs ˜(Cf ) do TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ Rand(σ0b , k′, 0)⊕ σ0a
Xi ← w0i w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pa(TE ⊕ σ0a)
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do ψ ← w0G ⊕ w0E ⊕ w0 //
 Y 0 ← w0G ⊕ w0E
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) return (TG, TE , ψ) //
 (TG, TE , Y 0)
if G˜i is a non-output gate then
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Sim∗NAND(σ0a, σ0b , w0i )
Fnon−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi)
else
(TGi , TEi , Y
0
i )← SimNAND(σ0a, σ0b )
F outi ← (TGi , TEi )
di ← lsb(Y 0i )⊕ yi
end if
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
proc GO1 (1
λ, C˜f , pif , T , xˆ): // G
CircR
2 private proc Sim
∗O
NAND1
(σvaa , σ
vb
b , w
vi
i , va, vb):
vˆ ← evalWires(C˜f , pif , xˆ) //
 SimONAND1 (σvaa , σvbb , va, vb):
for owi ∈ OW ˜(Cf ) do sa ← lsb(σvaa ); sb ← lsb(σ
vb
b )
w
vi
i  {0, 1}λ// w
v¯i
i ← w
vi
i ⊕ R k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
for iwj ∈ IW ˜(Cf ) do TG ← H(σvaa , k)⊕ O (σvaa , k, vb ⊕ sb)
B := v
pi
−1
f
(j)
, σBj ← wBpi−1
f
(j)
⊕ tj wva(vb⊕sb)G ← H(σvaa , k)⊕ saTG
for owi ∈ Inputs ˜(Cf ) do TE ← H(σvbb , k′)⊕ O (σ
vb
b , k
′, va)⊕ σvaa
Xi ← wvii w
vasb
E ← H(σ
vb
b , k
′)⊕ sb(TE ⊕ σvaa )
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do ψ ← wva(vb⊕sb)G ⊕ w
vasb
E ⊕ w
vi
i
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) //
 Y ← wva(vb⊕sb)G ⊕ wvasbE
if G˜i is a non-output gate then return (TG, TE , ψ) //
  (TG, TE , Y )
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Sim∗ONAND1 (σ
va
a , σ
vb
b , w
vi
i , va, vb)
Fnon−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi)
else private proc evalWires(C˜f , pif , xˆ):
(TGi , TEi , Y
vi
i )← SimONAND1 (σ
va
a , σ
vb
b , va, vb) for iwj ∈ C˜f do vi ← xi
F outi ← (TGi , TEi ) for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do
Y
v¯i
i ← Y
vi
i ⊕ R {a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i)
di ← lsb(Y vii )⊕ vi vi ← NAND(va, vb)
end if return vˆ
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
proc G3(1λ, C˜f , pif , T , xˆ): private proc Sim∗NAND3 (σ
0
a, σ
0
b , w
0):
R {0, 1}λ−1 1 //
 SimNAND3 (σ0a, σ0b ):
for owi ∈ OW ˜(Cf ) do pa ← lsb(σ0a); pb ← lsb(σ0b )
w0i  {0, 1}λ, w1i ← w0i ⊕ R k ← NextIndex(); k′ ← NextIndex()
for iwj ∈ IW ˜(Cf ) do TG ← H(σ0a, k)⊕H(σ1a, k)⊕ pbR
σ0j ← wpi−1
f
(j)
⊕ tj , σ1j ← σ0j ⊕ R w0G ← H(σ0a, k)⊕ paTG ⊕ R
for owi ∈ Inputs ˜(Cf ) do TE ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕H(σ1b , k′)⊕ σ0a
Xi ← wxii w0E ← H(σ0b , k′)⊕ pb(TE ⊕ σ0a)
for each gate G˜i∈C˜f do ψ ← w0G ⊕ w0E ⊕ w0
{a, b} ← GateInputs(G˜i) //
 Y 0 ← w0G ⊕ w0E
if G˜i is a non-output gate then return (TG, TE , ψ) //
 (TG, TE , Y 0)
(TGi , TEi , ψi)← Sim∗NAND3 (σ
0
a, σ
0
b , w
0
i )
Fnon−outi ← (TGi , TEi , ψi)
else
(TGi , TEi , Y
0
i )← SimNAND3 (σ0a, σ0b )
F outi ← (TGi , TEi )
Y 1i ← Y 0i ⊕ R , di ← lsb(Y 0i )
end if
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
FIGURE 8. The simulator for prv.simS security, and the hybrids used in the proof. We obtain G2 by adding the statements
within sharp corner boxes to G1. The use of the statements within rounded-corner boxes alters the procedures from garbling
of non-output gate to garbling of output gate. A ‘hat ’ represents a sequence or a tuple, for instance, Fˆ = (F1, F2, . . .) or
eˆ = (e1, e2, . . .).
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then our scheme is secure against semi-honest adver-
saries.
Proof. We prove the security of our scheme against
corruption of either parties, separately. First, consider
the case that P1 is corrupted. Since the ideal 2-OEP
functionality outputs ⊥ for P1, and the transcripts
received by P1 during OT reveals nothing other than
P1’s garbled input due to the ideal execution FOT in
the OT-hybrid model, we only need to prove that the
2PC phase does not give any private information about
P2’s input to P1. For any probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A1, controlling P1 in the real world,
we construct a simulation game based on prv.sim game
from [37] as follows. The simulation involves Initialize,
Garble, and Finalize procedures. The Initialize procedure
picks a value β ← {0, 1} randomly. Then, A1 makes a
single call to the Garble procedure (see prv.sim game of
Figure 7). Note that S denotes the simulation function,
and Gb denotes the actual garbling (Figure 8 shows the
procedure for S ). We highlight that in our simulation,
the side-information φ(f) is replaced by (C˜f , pif ,T ),
since they are already known to P1. Finally, in the
Finalize(β′) procedure, A1 tries to make a guess β′ for
the value of β, and the procedure outputs β
?
= β′. We
now prove that the simulation function output (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
is computationally indistinguishable from (F,X, d) by
using the chain of hybrids as follows (see also Figure 8).
1. S =c GRand1 : Since both generated (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ) outputs
include uniformly random values for components,
their distributions are identical. More concretely,
since the truth values of wires vi’s are used only as
a superscript for the tokens W vi byG1, these W vii ’s
could have been named W 0i for all i values.
2. GRand1 =c G
CircR
1 : Only the oracle O changed
from Rand to CircR. Due to our assumption
about the hash function, these two hybrids are
computationally indistinguishable.
3. GCircR1 =c G
CircR
2 : G2 is obtained by the addition of
the statements within sharp corner boxes to G1 in
Figure 8. Here, the variable R in G2 refers to the
R of the oracle CircR. The only difference between
the two hybrids is that some extra values that are
not used computed by G2 (those extra values will
be used in G3).
4. GCircR2 =c G3: G3 does not need to compute vi
for non-input wires and to randomly sample W vii ,
instead it randomly samples W 0i . Next, it sets
W 1i ←W 0i ⊕R instead of setting W v¯ii ←W vii ⊕R.
The algebraic relationships among variables remain
unchanged. The oracle calls are also expanded in
SimAnd3 to correspond to O = CircR.
Note that G3 computes (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ) as (Fˆ , eˆ, dˆ) ←
Gb(1λ, f); Xˆ ← En(eˆ, xˆ), which is exactly how these
values are computed in the real interaction in the
{replace the last three lines of S
with the following ones:}
k ← NextIndex(); r  {0, 1}λ
if yi = 0
then di ← (H(Y 0i , k), r)
else di ← (r,H(Y 0i , k))
end if
return (Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ)
FIGURE 9. The required modifications on Figure 8 in
order to show auth property.
prv.simS game. Therefore, the advantage of A1 in the
prv.sim game
Adv
prv.sim
G ,S (A , λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[prv.simAG ,S (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible. Hence, our scheme satisfies the security
notion of prv.simS and obv.simS
17. This proves that our
scheme is secure against the corrupted P1.
Second, consider the case that P2 is corrupted.
For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A2,
controlling P2 during our protocol in the real world,
we construct a simulator S ′ that simulates A2’s view in
the ideal world. S ′ runs A2 on P2’s input, and C˜f as
follows.
1. S ′ asks A2 to generate Wˆ 0 := [wˆ0i  {0, 1}λ] for
each owi ∈ OW and receives Wˆ 0.
2. S ′ then picks tˆj  {0, 1}λ for j = 1, . . . , N , and
computes Sˆ0 = [σˆj ← wˆ0pi−1f (j)⊕ tˆj ] and gives Sˆ
0 to
A2.
In the real execution of our protocol, P2 receives
only the message S0 in Round 2 (apart from the
exchanged messages during the OT protocol for P1’s
garbled input). However, the transcripts received by P2
during OT do not leak any information to P2 because
of FOT in the OT-hybrid model. Due to one-time pad
security, in P2’s view, the distributions of Sˆ
0 and S0 are
identical (i.e., USˆ0 ≈c US0). This concludes the security
proof of our scheme.
In order to achieve the authenticity property (i.e.,
auth), it is required to show that the probability of
an adversary finding a set Yˆ ′ 6= Ev(Fˆ , Xˆ) such that
De(dˆ, Yˆ ′) 6= ⊥ is negligible. In accordance with [25],
our garbling scheme in Figure 5 can be modified as
in Figure 6 to achieve authenticity property (i.e., the
antepenultimate line of Gb in Figure 5 can be modified
as k ← NextIndex(); di ← (H(Y 0i , k), H(Y 1i , k)), and
De(dˆ, Yˆ ) procedure in Figure 5 can be modified as
De(dˆ, Yˆ ) procedure in Figure 6).
17The proof for obv.simS differs from that of prv.simS only in
that in obv.simS , the simulator neither computes dˆ, nor receives yˆ.
So providing a proof for prv.simS also implies a proof for obc.simS .
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TABLE 5. Analysis of communication costs for 2-PFE schemes (see Section 3.1 for details of transfers in the OSN phases).
MS’13 [9] Our Protocol
Num. of Strings Str. Length (bits) Num. of Strings Str. Length (bits)
OSN
Before OT Ext. P2 → P1 N 2λ N λ
During OT Ext.
P1 → P2 λ 2N log(N) + 1 λ 2N log(N)−N + 1
P2 → P1 4N log(N)−N + 2 2λ 4N log(N)− 2N + 2 λ
After OT Ext. P1 → P2 N 2λ N λ
2PC Garbled Circ. P2 → P1 2N λ 1.5N λ
TOTAL (bits) (10N log(N) + 4N + 5)λ (6N log(N) + 0.5N + 3)λ
Theorem 5.2. Our modified scheme (see Figure 5
and Figure 6) satisfies the security notion of auth with
any H that has correlation robustness for naturally
derived keys.
Proof Sketch. We execute the simulator S (in Figure 8
with the modifications in Figure 9), and obtain
(Fˆ , Xˆ, dˆ). Then, we hand (Fˆ , Xˆ) to the adversary,
and receive Yˆ ′ from the adversary. After that we run
the decoding procedure (see procedure De in Figure 6)
on dˆ and the output of adversary Yˆ ′. If the result is
De(dˆ, Yˆ ′) = ⊥, then the adversary fails, otherwise it
succeeds. The adversary can win the game by guessing
a correct value r with probability at most 1/2λ where λ
is the security parameter. The rest of the proof utilizes
the same sequence of hybrids in the proof of Theorem
5.1.
6. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we evaluate the performance of
our protocol, and compare it with Mohassel and
Sadeghian’s 2-party PFE scheme [9]. Without loss of
generality, in order for a fair comparison, we assume
that the 2-OEP protocol of our scheme is also realized
by the OSN construction in [9], and that the OSN
phases in both protocols are optimized with the General
OT extension scheme of Asharov, Lindell, Schneider,
and Zohner [30]. Similar results can be obtained by
using other Ishai et al. based OT extension schemes [28,
29] as well.
Regarding the OSN phase, the total number of OTs
in our 2-PFE protocol is 2N log(N) − N + 1, while it
is 2N log(N) + 1 in [9] (see Section 3.1). Moreover,
our protocol requires only one of the tokens on a wire
entering the OSN phase, so the size of the rows in
Table 3 which enter each OT is reduced by a factor
of two [9], further resulting in a significant decrease
in communication cost. Regarding the 2PC phase,
our scheme garbles each non-output gate with three
ciphertexts, and each output gate with two ciphertexts.
This yields more than 25% reduction compared to the
same phase in the scheme in [9].
Table 5 shows the number of strings and their
corresponding lengths sent in each turn in both schemes
(see also Section 3.1 for details of transfers in the OSN
phases). We omit the OTs for P1’s garbled input, the
transfers for decoding the garbled output, and the base
OTs in the OT extension scheme [30]. The strings sent
by P2 during the OT extension in [9], in fact, consists of
4N log(N)−2N+2 of λ-bit stings and 2N λ-bit strings.
The data sent by P2 before OT extension can also be
sent during P2’s turn in OT extension for a saving in the
number of rounds. Table 6 reflects the communication
cost reduction achieved by our 2-PFE protocol for the
circuits with different number of gates.
Recently, in [22], Wang and Malluhi have attempted
to improve the 2-PFE scheme in [9] by removing only
one ciphertext from each garbled gate (in 2PC phase)
while remaining the cost of OSN phase unchanged.
However, the influence of 2PC phase in [9] on overall
communication cost is quite low (see Table 6). Reducing
the bandwidth use in the 2PC phase by 25% only results
in less than 1% reduction in the total cost. For instance,
given a circuit with 1024 gates, their optimization
reduces the communication cost of the 2PC phase from
4,096 λ-bit strings to 3,072 of them, while the OSN
phase cost remains 229,38 λ-bits. Therefore, the overall
gain from their optimization for this setting is ∼0.4%.
Considering the computational complexity, although
both schemes asymptotically require O(N log(N)) oper-
ations, our scheme achieves a linear time improvement
over [9]. More precisely, in OSN phase, our scheme
eliminates N oblivious transfer (OT) operations. This
results in a decrease of 2N symmetric encryptions per-
formed by P2 (P1’s computation cost remains the same
in this phase). Regarding the 2PC phase, our scheme
requires one additional operation per gate (during the
Ev procedure). This yields additional 0.5N symmetric
operations to be performed by P1 (P2’s computation
cost remains the same in this phase). Therefore, our
scheme reduces the overall computation cost by 1.5N
symmetric operations.
The round complexity of our scheme does not differ
from the 2-PFE scheme in [9]. Namely, both protocols
consist of a constant-round OT extension scheme in
OSN phase, and our 2PC phase consists of the same
number of rounds as in the garbling scheme used in [9].
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an efficient and secure
protocol for 2-PFE. The motivation behind our
work is that the bandwidth of various channels is
the main constriction for many secure computation
applications, including the ones for PFE. Our
optimization significantly improves Mohassel and
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TABLE 6. Communication cost comparison of 2-PFE schemes in terms of λ-bits.
Num. of MS’13 [9] Our Protocol Overall
Gates OSN Phase 2PC Phase Total OSN Phase 2PC Phase Total Reduction
28 47,109 1,024 48,133 27,139 768 27,907 42.0%
210 229,381 4,096 233,477 133,123 3,072 136,195 41.7%
212 1,081,349 16,384 1,097,733 630,787 12,288 643,075 41.4%
214 4,980,741 65,536 5,046,277 2,916,355 49,152 2,965,507 41.2%
216 22,544,389 262,144 22,806,533 13,238,275 196,608 13,434,883 41.1%
218 100,663,301 1,048,576 101,711,877 59,244,547 786,432 60,030,979 41.0%
220 444,596,229 4,194,304 448,790,533 262,144,003 3,145,728 265,289,731 40.9%
Sadeghian’s 2-PFE scheme [9] in both OSN and 2PC
phases in terms of communication complexity. In
particular, in OSN phase, our protocol reduces the
number of required OTs and data sizes entering the
protocol. In 2PC phase, our half gate based scheme
garbles each non-output gate with three ciphertexts,
and each output gate with two ciphertexts. All in
all, our protocol improves the state-of-the-art by saving
more than 40% of the overall communication cost. We
conclude with the following two open questions:
1. Although the 2-OEP protocol in [9], which we
utilize in our protocol, is quite efficient for many
circuit sizes, fails to be so in large-sized circuits due
to its O(g log(g)) complexity. This fact arises the
following question: Can we have a 2-OEP protocol
that has linear asymptotic complexity while also
being efficient in small circuit sizes?
2. Our 2-PFE protocol permits only one gate
functionality (e.g., NAND or NOR) in a boolean
circuit. This yields another important future
challenge: Can we have a gate hiding mechanism in
2-PFE schemes permitting the use of various gates
in logic circuit representations?
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